British naval intelligence and Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition of 1798 by Duffy, Michael
- r
i
i
I
278 Tbe Mariner's Mirror Vol. 84 No. 3 (Awgwst 1998),278-290
BRITISH NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, AND BONAPARIE'S
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION OF 1798
By Micbael Drffy
mid the bi-centennial celebrations of the battle of the Nile it is as well to reflect
that the posr of commander of the Mediterranean fleet was the most
demanding in the eighreenrh-century Royal Navy. His force had to cover a
,h."rr. of operation-s 2,000 miT.s long, with two major naval bases (Toulon and Cadiz)
to watch as well as a lesser one at Cirtagena. An enemy who escaped him and got out
into the Atlantic had an unlimited range of damaging options oPen to Pursue, iro.m
attacking Britain's eastern or wesrern empire (as in tils and 1Bo5) to suPPoling te
Brest f le"et in a combined invasion in overwhelming numbers (1690, 1779,1781)- H.
was far removed from the Admiralty so that an exchinge of correspondence took from
rwo ro three months and the mosr i...nt British news icquired by Nelson's squadron
at the end of M"y ITgBwas rhrough extracts from the Londott press. quoted in captured
French ,r.*rp"iers. He was far i.*orr.d from any dockyard - the nearest available
drydock -*r^riplymouth and rn 1798 the nearest watering and care..Alg naval.!1t"
*", 
", 
Gibraltar. \ifh.reas many command decisions for the Channel Fleet couid be
taken in close concert with the Admiralty, the Mediterranean commander had to take
the entire burden on himself as well as a whole range of additional resPonsibilities. No
other commander had to deal with so many foreign Powers as that in the Mediterranean.
FIe was authorized to correspond with'British envoys and consuls throughout the
theatre. Often he had to take ind.p..tdent decisions on how to deal with international
crises, far awayfrom Admiralty oi Foreign Office instructions: he could even set off a
war without i"bin.t authorization, as Nelson did in the aftermath of his victory at-the
Nile, when he encouraged Naples to attack the French. The flagship of the commander-
in-chief of the Mediter"rrn."r *as a combination of a floating Admiralty, Navy Board
and Foreign Office.l
The p"osition was thus an onerous and exhaustin_g office. which burnt uP
commani.rs, damaging their health and their judgement. In 1798 the commander-in-
chief was AdmiratitrJ Earl of St Vincent, t.*porarily based on the Tagus, who
despatched Nelson back into the Mediterranean in command of.a squadronto oPerate
in those warers. St Vincenr's rwo immediate predecessors, Lords Hood and Hotham,
h"d gone home in something like disg racq while a subordinate commander with a
d.t"Jh"d squadron ar Gibraltlr in 1796, Admiral Man, had a nervous breakdown and
withdre- hi, ships to Britain when the outbreak of war with Sp-ain confronted him with
the vastly larger Spanish Cadtzfleet. Vhen in ill-health himself in early 1'798 St Vincent
recomm."di th"t any successor'should possess both_temper and good nerves'.2 St
Vincent, the toughest of admirals, himself suffered something like a.nervous breakdown
in the followin {yr^t, and the strain killed Collingwood a decade later.
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The greatest support for 'temper and good nerves' was to have quick, accurate and
detailed information which would enable a commander to make considered decisions.
Yet this was one of the greatest problems which vastly increased the strain of the
command. All this can be shown through examining the under-studied intelligence
dimension of the launching of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition from Toulon and the
norrh-wesrern Italian ports rn1.798.It ook place at a particularly difficult time to secure
good information because the Spanish entry into the war had forced the British
Mediterranean fleet to withdraw to operate from the Tagus at the end of 1796.In early
1798, therefore, the French dominated Mediterranean 'waters and starved the
information flow from thence. Although he defeated the Spanish fleet in Febru ary 1.797 ,
in the battle which won him his title, St Vincent could only send occasional frigates on
forays into the Mediterranean to coilect such information as they could,3 while British
envoys and consuls tried to send intelligence out to him via neutral ships or armed
merchanrmen to Gibraltar.a Flowever French warships and privateers ensured that little
gor our, and intelligence information from Italy, where Britain was able to maintain a
diplomatic presence, had to be re-routed overland via Germany and Hamburg to
London and sent thence to St Vincent's fleet blockading Cadiz. Hence news could be
very stale when it reached him!
Moreover London had more immediate preoccupations in early 1798 with trouble
in Ireland and the threat of French invasion. Bonaparte had been appointed commander
of the French forces along the Channel coast and was assembiing landing craft in the
French seaports to invade either England or Ireland where there had already been one
abortive Fiench attempt at the end of 1796 and which was on the verge of rebellion.
Bonaparre was seen by ^British agent conducting a tour of inspecfion of the Channel
ports in February 1798,s but unknown to the British as a result of his tour Bonaparte
idvised the Direcrory to cali off the invasion and proposed instead the aiternatives of
an attack on Hanover and Hamburg or on the Levant and India. On 5 March the
Directory accepted the proposal for an invasion of Egypt to set up a French colony and
threaten British pr.ponderance in India, ordering the fleet to be prePared by 4 April
and the expedition to be ready to sail by 9-19 April. The expedition, initially agreed at
24.,600 infintry and 2,BOO cavalr/, was to be prepared at Toulon (where the main
battlefleet was to be assembled), Marseilles, Genoa, Civitavecchia and Bastia, and on
the Zth Bonaparte issued orders for preparations to be completed by 4-9 Aprii.5
British aftenrion was not drawn to the Mediterranean until the beginning of April
when a request reached London from Vienna that a British fleet should be sent back
into the 'wesrern Mediterranean to protect Austria's Italian prot6g6 Naples from
threatened French attack.T The Admiralty was consulted and clearly had not yet got
wind of any large expedition preparing at Toulon when on the 6th it reported on the
srare of French flr..r in that tLreatie. The First Lord, Earl spencer,'wrote that the French
had only nine line of battle ships in service in the Mediterranean, six at Corfu and three
at Toulon, with rwo more preparing ar that latter port. Such reports as had been received
from Toulon indicated that the French had begun to prepare a small armament of five
of rhe line in January,bur that progress was slow because of scarcities in the arsenal and
Iack of sailori. A r.port had alio been received on 25 March from the British Consui at
Corfu that the Frerrch squadron there was about to return to Toulon with the captured
---1
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Venetian fleet (five battleships and three frigates). However he reported the latter to be
in very bad condition and the French squadron badly equipped and manned, so that
this news did not cause alarm, and nor did the report from a British frigate questioning
neutrals coming out of Cadtz that talk at the main Spanish naval base was of the Toulon
fleet being about to join them. The Admiralty was sure that the condition of the Toulon
arsenal would not a11ow it to equip more than ten battleships for serious operations.s
It was only in the week after Spencer's 5 April review that reports at last began to
reach London indicating that something rather larger was happening at Toulon. Copies
of the Paris newspaper L'Echo from 26March to 4 April were received on the 9th and
contained a report that six battleships were now ready at Toulon with another arming
rapidly.e A correspondent in Paris relayed news from Genoa that General Berthier had
arrived there, that he had demanded that all government vessels hould be made ready
for a very important expedition, and that work was starting rapidiy to supply 20 ships.10
Probably the same correspondent despatched on 4 April news of the arrival of the Corfu
force at Toulon, and L'Ecbo of e-g April carried news from Toulon of Zl March that
nearly 500 sailors had been brought to that port and that 800 more were awaited from
Bordeaux.ll Clearly the French were making serious efforts to man a fleet at Toulon,
while the information from Genoa about Berthier indicated that they were intending
to take troops with them on Genoese transports.
In fact the lack of resources in the Mediterranean ports and the sudden eruption of
awar scare with Austria led to Bonaparte's sailing date being put back from 20 April
to 19 Mry. This was fortunate for watchers in London because it was not until about
24 Apnl that the British government began to get direct accounts from its own agents
in north-west Italy of what was taking place in that area. Piedmont, Genoa and Tuscarr/,
though effectively under French military control, were officially neutral so that there
were still British officials close enough to procure more detaiied information. Ministers
were particui arly lucky that Earl St Vincent had sent a naval lieutenant, \flilliam l)ay,
to Genoa to try to sell three Navy Board transports and release their crews left stranded
at that port when he had hastily evacuated the Mediterranean at the end of 1796.12D^y
was thus on the spot to listen and to observe with a practised naval eye. His first report,
sent overland and dated 31 March, was received about 24 Aprll and told that 66
transports were fitting out at Genoa, shortly to be increased to 90, to receive a substandal
body of troops under the command of General Baraguey d'Hilliers who would himself
be under the command of Bonaparte. Day estimated from the state of preparations that
the transports would not be ready to sail much before the beginning of May. He
reported that,their rendezvous with the French fleet was to be off Ajaccio in Corsica,
and he stated the entire escorting battlefleet as likely to be 27 ships of the line, viz. six
French battleships from Corfu, rwo at Corsica and five Venetian (but all of these badly
equipped and manned), seven well-equipped French battleships from Toulon and also,
according to rumour, seven Spanish battleships from Cartagena. \ilord was that the
whole would proceed to Cadi z to break the British blockade of the main Spanish
battlefleet at that port.13
From Turin the Secr etary of Legation, Thomas Jackson, reported much the same.
Orders had been given for 8,000 French troops to march to Genoa. The great size of
the force together with the news that they were taking three months'provisions with
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them seemed to indicate a more distant object of attack than Sardinia or Siciiy which
were both near and weakly defended. The reported size of the naval force being collected
seemed to suggest hat the expedition expected to meet the British fleet, which indicated
a destination outside the Mediterranean, so that Jackson concluded that the expedition
might well be destined for the Spanish coast to raise the blockade of Cad rz and then
attack Portugal.l a However along with this report the Foreign Office sent the Adm rca\ty
another on 24 April 'on the accuracy of which the greatest reliance is placed'. This
contained news from Madrid that it was surmised in Spain that the Toulon armament
was to connect up with the Spanish forces at Cartagena and Cadrzto form a united fleet
of SO battleships and go to Brest to support an invasion of Britain.ls
These new reports of the size of the force being assembled in the Mediterranean
shook the Admiralty. Spencer told the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, on 25 April
that 'The Toulon armament must surely be much exaggerated or: all the accounts we
have received hitherto from there must have been totally false'.16 Yet further accounts
arriving in the next few days confirmed the size of the enterprise which wa_s reported
as preparing on the south coast of France and ail over Italy and they indicated the
preparation of a fleet of up to 1.7 line of battie ships and ten frigates.lT
There was no doubt now that a vast expedition 'was preparing, and there was also
some information of when it was due to depart. D^y had believed that it could not be
got ready before the beginning of May. Jackson at Turin reported on 4 April (received
about 28th) that it was ordered to be ready by the 20th but that from its state it could
not sail unti l  late May.18
The problem remained as to where it was going, for reports of its destination
oscillated wildly. The French Directory did its best to muddy the waters, taking quick
action afrcr leaks that it was destined for Egypt appeared in the Paris newsp apers Le
Swrveillant and Le Monitewr on L April. On the same day it ordered that four'ordinary
journalists' should be informed that Bonaparte was ordered to Brest to command the
army of England, and an article was inserted tn Le Monitewr on 4 April to the same
effect. The intention was presumably that this disinformation should reach British
intelligence and it succeeded: on 9 April this announcement was recorded in the
Admiralry files from a run of L'Echo from 26 March to 4 April.le About a fortnight
later, however, the same files recorded a report in a run of Monitewrs from 17 April,
dated Toulon 5 April, that Bonaparte was expected at that port and that it was presumed
that the expedition was destined for Naples and Siciiy.2o
The Secretaries of State, to whom most foreign intelligence initially came, were as
perplexed as the Admiralty. Besides passing on to Spencer the reports from Turin and
Madrid described above, the Foreign Secretary recorded in his notebook journal:
April 24 - Accounts of the preparation said to be making for embarkation on board the Toulon
ships. Supposed destination of these - Portugal - Napies - Egypt. The first is the more rational
plan [Portugal was Britain' s last remaining ally and vulnerable to attack].
Aprii 26 - It appears that 61'78',71' believes the object to be Egypt incredible as it seems.
April 27 - 91,7 63 informs me that the destination of the Toulon fleet is for Barcelona to join the
troops assembied at Perpignan and to march through Spain to Porrugal. There is I fear but too
much reason to think this intell igence true. Troops are also said to be marching towards Bayonne
for the same obiect .21
7
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At the same time the Secr etary for tWar, Henry Dundas, sent the Admtralty an account
received from an American lately come over from Le Havre that (a) there was a build-up
of troops along the French Channel coast and a plan to attack the Channel Islands as
the firsi step in 
"n 
invasion programme; (b) emissaries had arrived from England and
Ireland ,rd or. of the Irish leaders in exile, Napper Tandy,'was preparing to accomPany
an invasion of Ireland (he did in fact sail with a small expedition in August); (c)
conversations in Paris indicated a vast scheme of future French conquests to
revolutionize Sardinia and Naples, then to break with Prussia over Hamburg, then with
Austria in order to revolutionize Poland; and (d) there was a'strange scheme resPecting
Egypt' founded upon an agreemenr extorted from the Ottoman Porte to allow 400
fi.".tr officers to pass through his lands to India to join the pro-French Tipu Suitan
of Mysore and the Mahratras. As the least advantage of this plan it was hoped to remove
fromFrance Bonaparte and alarge army for whose services the Directory could at that
time find no further use.22
This was not too inaccurare a picture of all the projects considered by the Directory
in early I7gB. Egypt was inciuded in this report but it was mentioned as only the last
of a long list. Mor.orrer the intelligence was accompanied by 
" 
warning from Dundas
to Sp.nJ.r that the American was not in British p"y and that 
'I can give- you nothing to
enlighten you either as to the character of the informer or the means of information he
i, pJsr.rr.d of; and the oniy use such information can be of is by comparing it with
other channels and thereby judging the probability'.23 Vhat most occupied Ministers
about this reporr was probably what it said about invasion pians. Spencer was already
becoming 
"larmed 
thai the Brest fleet was arming faster than expected and would have
3O line oibattl. ships ready in two months'time. Counter-preparations were advanced
for a commando raid, launched on L4 May, to bottle up invasion craft assembled at
Osrend by destroying the canal exits there.2a Egypt was rather remote from all this.
Vhen, therefore, on 29 Apni Spencer ordered St Vincent to detach part of his fleet
blockading Cad rz andsend it into the Mediterranean in the hope of encouraging Austria
to re-ent"ith. war, he could only telI him that the obvious employment for such a force
-w.as to watch the Toulon armament at whose object Spencer could only guess. It was
very probably ir the first insrance intended for Naples and this was alarming the
A.rttiir.rs, brri it was 'in truth more likely to be destined either for Portugal or Ireland' .25
Two days later news of the worsening relations between Austria and France led the
Cabinet to send reinforcements to St Vincent so as to enable him to detach a larger force
into the Mediterranean. By then Spencer had received further news which in one way
limited the possibilities regarding the destination of the Toulon expedition and in
anorher ."t.nd.d them. D^y ieft Genoa on 13 April, his mission having collapsed when
the French took control of the British transpor$ there, and he made for London as fast
as he could overland. Arriving on 1 May he indeed caught up with a letter he had sent
from Genoa on 10 April announcing the French fleet as likely to be 14 line of battle
ships according to a reported statement by Baraguey d'Hilliers. The Venetian
battl.ships *ere nor sound .no.rgh to take their place in the line and only a few would
go cut do*r as frigates. Day t.poited in person to Spencer that he thought it impossible
io, th. Genoese transports to be ready before 11,-t2 May and also that he did not
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consider them seaworthy enough to stand a voyage beyond the relativeiy placid waters
of the Mediter r anean,26
This last eyewitness news from an experienced officer convinced the Admiralty that
the likely field of operations of the .*p.dition was confined to the Mediterranean' but
,r.rr..th.less that was still a vasr theaire. Vhere could Bonaparte employ such a.large
armament in those warers ? Spencer told St Vincent that 
'it is therefore most probable
that they are destined either Tot th. coast of Spain or Naples, or (though I can scarce
believe it) for the Levant'.27
The Levant now came into more serious consideration because D"y brought news
that French rransporm were loading 4,000 very 
.large ten-hooped barreis without
brrrrgholes at Leghirr,, and the only obi.9t that could be conjectured for such an unlikely
cargowas ro ,tt"'.h them to theship, oi th.. line so as to buoy these heavily-1.td.l vessels
orr.? some shailows. This was heli to indicate the Levant or more probably the Black
Sea since Admiralty information was that large ships had to be lightened to pass the
Dardenelles.2s Even so, Spencer could 
'scarce believe' that the Levant was Bonaparte's
ob;.., and pointed to Spain or Naples. a_s q{ot aiternatives. tWhen this information,
;lJ"g with th. ..i.rforcJ*errrr, ,."ihed St vincent, he passed 
.it on.together with 11
more line of battle ships to Nelson, whom he had already sent into the Mediterranean
with three battleships to see what was going on at Toulon'
This was the l"ri irrt.lligence that reached Nelson from London before Bonaparte
acrually sailed from Touloir on L 9-20 M"y.. In London, however, Ministers formed a
fairly jood idea of the expedition's size and date of departure, and received more clues
", 
,o ils destination befoie rhey heard that it had set sail.
Vithin a week of passing the above information to St Vincent, Ministers had copies
of L,Echo of zt Apriil Maiwhich carried a.reporr 
"f.1: 
April flo1Toulon that 24,000
men would embark on 20 M"y (Bonaparte hai asked for i2,ooo-28,000 and embarked
3g,oOO including contingenrs fro.tr Italy and Corsica). Confirmation from Fiorence that
th. ."p.dition ?rorrid J^rry three monrhs' provisions indicated a more distant object
than Sardinia or Naples. vhere then? Pointers to__Egypt were.now _growing..From
Germany came ,r.*, gleaned from the letters of talkative French academics going on
the expehiriorr. M. de bolemieu, mineralogist Td,siperintendeat of Mines, 
wrote to a
,man of letters' in Germany who told 
"rrotf,.r, 
M. de ft., Professor of Natural History
at Gottingen. De Luc also happened to. be a member of Queen Cfiariotte's household
and an agenr of the Foreign clffi.. and passed the news on. De Dolemieu s/rote that
books were being taken o"n bo"rd abouf journeys.to the Levant, EgyPt'Persia,^India,
Turkey, the Black and Caspian Seas, and Anar.hsir', journey in Greece' Two Professors
of Arabic, persian and Tuikish *.i. going with them..De Doiemieu added that it was
said that ,h.y were going to conqu.. F,gyir, cil the Isthmus of Suez and seize Britain's
commer.. #irh Indla *i"th 3o,OOb men under Bonaparte'2e
Vhat historians have seized upon as rhe most accurate intelligence aPP-reciation of
French intentions was passed ,o ,h. Admiraky !y. the Foreign office on 24May 
' Dated
i5 Apr1, it cam. fro- Joh' udn9r, the British cotrsui at Leghorn where he had
compiled it with the heli of a local British merchant, a Mr Jones, who had extensive
commerciai corr.rpond.nce throughout the Mediterranean. Udney overestimated the
force invoived ^ rioships of the l i ie and frigates,600 transports and 50'000 men' His
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account of its departure date as between25 April and 10 May was between its actual
init iai and final sail ing dates. Udney stated that between those dates it was to assemble
at Ajaccio or Malta, which'was to be surrendered to the French on their appearance)
and that Alexandria was the principal destination, and even the Black Sea with the
consent of the Porte. At all events the blow was intended against the East India
Company's power in India, to reach which the troops might march overland to the
Persian Gulf or go via the Red Sea.30 Indirect support for such a possibility came from
Jackson at Turin who reported on 14 April (recorded at the Admiralty about 28 May)
that accounts from Barcelona and other Spanish ports made no mention of any military
preparations nor expectation of the arrival of troops.31
Flowever ali this evidence pointing to the Levant and the Orient had to be set against
other reports received about 1g-rO M"y. The early Italian rumours that the armamenr
was to join the Spanish fieet and pass into the Ocean kept resurfacing. They seemed
confirmed by an insidious anonymous lette r of 9 M"y from Rastadt, where the French
were negotiating with Austria and the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, that it had
been noted from Paris that Egypt and India were only a mask to the real object, which
was to join the Spanish at Cadiz and then attack first Portugal and then Britain.32
It was this last intelligence that the Prime Minister, Pitt, and the Foreign Secretary
chose to believe - perhaps because this was where the most immediate threat now lay
after Ireland exploded into revolt in the later part of May. It was hard to resist the
conviction that their enemywould not at once strike at this vital weakness. On 31 May
Pitt wrote to his friend Lord Mornington, Governor Generai of India, not to warn him
that Bonaparte was bound in his direction, but to announce that the'Ir ishJacobins'had
risen and that France would probabiy vy to invade Ireland from Toulon. Next day the
Foreign Secretary wrote also that 'Bonaparte has at last embarked at Toulon with the
project of attacking Ireland from thence, taking or not taking Portugal in his way
according to circumstances. \fle have been beforehand with him and have reinforced St
Vincent so secretly that (mirabelw dictw) it is at this hour not known here that we have
done so'. Grenville looked forward to seeing Bonaparte arrive in Britain in a very
different way from that which he intended.33
\fithin a few days Ministers learned via the Paris newspapers that the Toulon
armament had sailed on 19 May. Detailed accounts were provided of the composition
of the force, variously reported as (1) 15 i ine of battle ships, 18 frigates and sloops,
300-400 transports, (2) 13 battleships, 5 frigates, 2 brigs, 8 ships armed en flwte.,4 avisos,
4 bomb-vessels and 6 gunboats, and (3) (in Le Moniteur,3l May) 13 battleships - one
of  t tB , threeof  gOandnine o f  l+  guns,seven40-gunf r igates ,  and1,41 t ranspor tswi th
19,000 men from the French ports (Ministers could add at least 10,000 from Italy). The
information could hardly have been more complete or accurate. The expedition
consisted of 13 battleships of the categories tated by Le Monitewr (except that Admiral
Brueys's f iagship, L'Orient.,was of 120 not 118 guns), six fr igates, one corvette, two of
the line and seven frigates armed en flwte, eight brigs and avisos, four bomb-vessels and
14 gunboats) with38,000 troops in some 2BO transports.3a
French ne'wspapers arriving subsequently also indicated the direction it was going.
L'Echo of I June carried a report of the armament being seen on 22 Mry sailing
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sourh-easr, and on 5 June reported it being sighted on23 Mty 60-80 leagues outh-east
of Toulon being carried along on constant north-west winds.3s
Despite the prejudices of Pitt and Grenville, and despite another red-herring from
Hamburg that the force was destined for America and the \West Indies, Henry Dundas,
the Secr etary for Var and also President of the Board of Control for India, was now
sure that the armament was on its way to Egypt and began to take precautions lest
Nelson missed it.36 Three new pieces of information arriving before 13 June seemed to
clinch the matter. Firstly, from Frankfurt came an account of another conversation
between two French academics, one of whom, Faujas de St Fond, was in the empioy of
the French government and who stated that the Toulon expedition was certainiy sailing
for Egypr, that it had been arranged with the Porte (untrue), that Bonaparte had 40,000
men (he had 38,000), and that after securing the ports of Egypt he would take the nearest
roure by Arabia through Persia and across the Indus to India.37 Secondly, on 11 June
came a reporr from the acting British envoy at Florence, dated e May, that the French
general C..rroni, who was going with it, had declared the expedition destined for
Alexandria whence the French army would attempt by land to reach Tipu Sultan, the
ruler of Mysore and main barrier to British proponderance over southern India.38 And
lastly, a report arrived from the Cape of a proclamation issued by theFrench Governor
of the Mauritius on 30 January indicating that Tipu had asked for an alliance with France
and calling for a contingent of French volunteers from that colony to serve with Tipu's
army.39
The incredible had now become credible and steps 'were hastily taken to reinforce
India and to bar the mouth of the Red Sea in case Bonaparte managed to get to EgyPr.oo
One of the biggest obstacles to the British government accepting the truth of the
Egypt-India p-jecr had been the imaginative vastness of the enterprise. It had seemed
b;;[ roo mignificent and too far-fetched a conception to be a practical military
operation. Spencer admitted that'It had for some time been reported that the armament
was destined for Egypt, but the plan seemed so chimerical and romantic that little credit
was given to it'.41 Now, however, a chastened Foreign Secretary wrote to his brother
on 13 June that:
It realiy looks as if Bon aparte was after all, in sober truth going to Egypt: and Dundas seems to
think the scheme of ^ttaiking India from thence not so impractical as it may appear. I am still
incredulous as to the latter point, though as to the former I am shaken. But as Bonaparte on the
23rdwas still off Toulon and as Lord St Vincent must have detached on the 21.st at latest, there is
much reason to hope that Nelson may destroy all these visions, be they what they may.a2
Nelson had been ordered into the Mediterranean by St Vincent on 2 May with
insrructions to take a small force of three battleships, two frigates and a sloop off Toulon
to reconnoitre and discover what he could of French intentions. He sailed into a
distinctly unfavourable environment where he could expect no support and a benign
neutrality oriy from the Italian states of Tuscany and Nap.les and the Arab rulers of
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Although he was closest o Toulon in fact the information
h.ir", able to garhe, on the spot *ui .n.t.h less than that accruing to Ministers in far-off
London. The J*"il size of hii reconnaisance squadron very much limited the radius of
information he could garher, since he needed to keep it concentrated both for its own
security in hostile waters and also in readiness to react to any move from Toulon. Shut
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out by French troops from the coasts where the expedition'was preparing, he had to
glean his information from ships captured or interrogated at sea.
On i 7 May he reported back to St Vincent that everything he had learned indicated
that the expedition was preparing to sail. One of his frigates captured a 5-gun French
corvette , Lo Pierre, which came out of Toulon the previous night and its 65
crew-members were interrogated separately. From their statements he learned that
Bonaparte had arrived in Toulon the previous Friday, that 15 ships of the line were
ready for sea but that only six were said to be sailing with the transports (was this
deliberate disinfomation to try to draw Nelson into a trap by misleading him into
attacking Brueys's much stronger fleet?). About 12,000 men were embarked, cavalry
had arrived at Toulon but Nelson could not learn whether it had also been embarked,a3
and no one knew whither the armament was destined. 'Al1 this information is but little
more than you knew when I left you' admitted Nelson to St Vincent, and privately he
added that 'They order their matters so well in France, that all is secret'.44
Then disaster struck. From 19-21 May Nelson's squadron was hit by a gale. FIis
scouting ships, the frigates and sloop lost contact and never regained it,as and on21 May
Nelson's flagship lost its foremast and main and mtzzen topmasts to the storm and had
to be towed to the safety of a Sardinian port by the other two battleships. Refused heip
by the nervous Sardinian authorities, Nelson had to make his own repairs, which took
time whiie temporary masts'q/ere rigged, and it was not until 27 May that he was ready
to put to sea again. In the meantime the French had got out of Toulon. Sailing on the
19th the expedition ran down the coast to Genoa to pick up the contingent from that
port and then stood across to Corsica. There it remained from 23-30 M"y waiting for
the contingents from Ajaccio and Civitavecchia. The former joined on the 27th., but
when the latter had still not arrived by the 3Oth Bonaparte and Brueys sailed slowly
down the east coast of Sardinia, stood across to Sicily which they reached on 7 June,
and on the 9th they approached their first objective, Malta. There they'were at last joined
by the 70 ships of the Civitavecchia contingent which had finally sailed on 28 M"y.o,
As Bonaparte passed down one side of Corsica and Sardinia, so Nelson's three
battleships were beating back towards Toulon up the other. On 31 May he was back
off Toulon and began casting about for where the French had gone. His two consorts
performed valiantly in the place of cruisers, picking up a vessel from Marseilles on the
2Bth from which they learned of Bonaparte's departure and from which they also
secured copies of several Paris papers dated up to 16 May.azWhile still in the vicinity
of Toulon Nelson was found by ^ brig from St Vincent with ne'ws that 11 more ships
of the line were coming to join him and so he held up his pursuit until their arrival. On
7 June his consorts captured two vessels from Genoa,48 and these and the Marseilles
ship provided all the extra information that Nelson had ro go on when his
reinforcements arrived that same evening. He then had the misfortune ro be becaimed
and it was not untii the 12th that he was able to round Cape Corse and begin his pursuit.
His search was plagued by inaccurate information. He heard that the Genoa force had
not all been embarked on the 2nd and so he assumed that the armamenr vias sti11 quite
close. He therefore started by searching all the likely rendezvous bays down the coast
between Corsica and ltaly. It was not until 14 June off Civitavecchia that he spoke to
a Tunisian cruiser which told him that on the lOth it had spoken to a Greek which had
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passed through the French fleet on the 4th steering eastward off the north-west coast
of Sicily. Fearing that the Kingdom of Naples was therefore the French objective Nelson
hurried southwards.ae
Nelson reached Naples on 17 June but found the Neapolitan capital secure. Naples
was not the French target, but the Neapolimns told him that the French fleet had been
reported off Malta on the 8th about to attack it. As he passed through the Straits of
Messina on the 20th he was informed by the British Consul at Messina that Malta had
surrendered on the 15th. Pressing on his scouting brig intercepted a Genoese merchant
brig off Cape Passaro on the 22nd. The Genoese vessel declared that it had left Malta
the previous day, that Malta had surrendered on the 15th, and that the French fleet had
left on the 16th - it was supposed for Sicily.
Again the wind intervened, blowing strongly from \fN\f, and since Nelson could
not get on to Maita until it moderated he took stock of the situation from the
information he had no'w collected. It is uncertain that Nelson ever received Udney's
reporr of tO April (see above) which Spencer despatched on to St Vincent on its receipt
on 24 May, but there is in the Nelson Papers a copy of a letter from Udney of z0 April,
which he may have received as his squadron looked into Leghorn on its way southward.
This now reported the French at 40,000 men on at least 400 vessels. Despite a
disinfornnation campaign from Genoa by Mons. Belville, former French Consul at
Leghorn, Udney had pretty well-founded intelligence that their first attempt would be
on Malta and from there to invade Siciiy, to secure that granary, and then Naples, in all
of which their emissaries had secured a strong party. He was far less certain of what
they would then do with such an immense force, but reflecting on the former plan of
Catherine the Great of Russia to get possession of Egypt, he was convinced that in his
unbounded enterprises, Bonaparte would with more reason at some time hereafter
pursue the sarne scheme and seize and fortify Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. Udney
ihorrght that if the French intended uniting with Tipu Sultan against Britain;s
possessions in India, the danger of losing half their army in crossing the desert would
be no obstacle.so
Nelson now knew the French had seized Malta. However he also knew from what
the Neapolitans told him that they were at peace with France and that Bonaparte had
senr ashore to Sicily that the King need not be alarmed since Sicily was not his object.
The Neapolitan administration in Sicily also appeared not to be alarmed otherwise it
would hirre sent for Nelson as he passed down the coast. He added up what he now
knew of the French strength - 40,000 troops in 280 transports, with much artillery,
waggons, draught-horses, cavalr/, artificers, naturalists, astronomers, mathematicians
.t.. H. now knew that thei r rendezvous in case of separation had been first Bastia then
Malta - going eastward. All this he had picked up in his search so far. The French
strength -m ioo grear to be designed simpiy to attack Malta, yet Naples thought itself
safe and the westerly winds at that season made it almost impossible to get back against
the wind to Spain, particularly with such alarge and unwieldy armada. Consequentl;'
he concluded that they must be intending to go on eastward, and in these circumstances
he suspected that they were indeed heading for Egypt whence they might get to the Red
Sea and into the Indian Ocean ro attack Brit ish India - the only Brit ish possession that
could be attackeci by going in that direction.sl
t-
i
2 8 8 BRiTISH NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 1798
The appreciation w-as exactly right. Unforrunately one smali piece of inaccurate
irrt.iligence ruined the d.r'art"ting"use *", mighl .h"y. been made 
of it to catch
Bonapa rte atsea en roure for Alexri.d.ir. The French had in fact left Malta on the i9th,
Lr.. 'days later than the Genoese lt ig had told Nelson's scout. 
\Whether the
misinformation was deliberate or accidetrld or whether Nelson's scouting brig had
,*nf, misheard what the Genoese crew had said, the difference in dates was crucial.
N.lro' rejected going on ro Malta and instead pressed on eastward expecting the French
to be three drfJf"tri.,- ahead of him than th.y actually were. Three French frigates,
*ni.f, might hr,r. led Nelson ro the French convoy, were seen on the morning of the
22nd,but were nor considered of sufficient importlt:. to risk_ separating_the squadron
in chasing them. Consequently he actually oveitook the French fleet off Crete on 25-26
J.rrr. *itliorrt ,..ing it 
"nd 
p".r.d on befoie he begT t.o look in earnest around the point
"*h.r. he expect.d L .rr.h rrp with !h.T..tt For a brief moment the destiny of 
Napoleon
Bonaparte, and indeed of E.rrope, had been in the hands, or rather the words, of the
masrer of a Genoese brig. Had^Nelson caught the armament at sea there could have
been little contesr between his crack ,q,r"drln and Brueys's battleshiPt, overcrowded
with troops and with their gundeck, obrr.,rctgd by Bonaparte.'s artiliery train which,
"guirrr, 
,r*"1 *irh.r, he had"insisted on emb_arkils !1 the *arships. At the subsequent
battle of the Nt1. B.rr.y, lost his life when his fl{ship ['Orienr blew up. How much
different -ighi hlrrory have been had that h"pp.ir.d while Bonaparte was on board?
But Nelson was now lhasing an enemy who *as in fact behind him, and when h. g."'
to Alexandria first and founith.y *.r. not there he was in agony that he had made the
wrong appreciation. He dashed off at once north to Asia Minor lest the French had
gone ;h.;; - the French in fact arrived at Alexandria rwo days afterhe left it. Not finding
them on the Anatolian coast he beat back again, mortified, to Sicily to.reProvis.ion and
b.gir.oll..tin! information again. on 23 Jirty.h. left Syracuse and at last, on the 28th,
off the Mor.^,"he receirr.d t*L pieces of intelligence that the French had been seen
steering rorrth-."st from Crete ff.rr weeks befoie. They had gone to Egypt after.aii!
Flo*.i.r, by the time he got back to Alexandria agag on 1 August Bonaparte had
disembarked his troop, ,ni ail but conquered Egypi. Th.t. remained accessible only
Brueys's battlefl..t ,li.ltering in Aboukir Bay 
"nd 
thit Nelson's ships annihilated that
same night.s3
In the end those responsible for interpreting intelligence got it right- Already Dundas
had taken steps ,o ,.rri a naval force to shut ih. .tttiance to the Red Sea and to warn
the Go,r.rrroi General of India, while Nelson at last caught the French fleet and
J"rrroyed it. But there was very little certainty i" !\.. information at hand; much was
irrspired guesswork and gut instincr, and it ali could have been wrong!.N.\9.". could
h",r. b..ri 2,000 miles o,riif the Toulon force had gone the othe t ,y^y (and he did indeed
get it wrong in early 1805 by going eastward each time during Villeneuve's two attemPts
io .r.rp. fio* Tollon foi t[. V.rt Indies).sa The s_train on the nerves was immense.
As Nelion's squadron chased towards Egypt for the first time inJune, his senior captain
wrote:
some days musr now elapse before we can be relieved from our cruel suspense; and if, at the end
of our jorrrn.y, we find we are upon a wrong scent'-our embarrassment will be-great.indeed'
Fortunat.iy, r o"ty act here .r, ,..orrd; but did iheciief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would
be more than my ioo irritable nerves would bear'55
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